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This paper studies the relevance of strategic trade effects in the environmental policy for 
the European electricity sector. The production, investment and trade of electricity are 
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The Opening of the European Electricity Market 
and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of 
Competition Matter? 
1.   INTRODUCTION   
 
Virtually all generation technologies have some negative impact on the environment. By far 
the most significant externality is air pollution. At present the most relevant and 
widespread form of European regulation is the application of technical emission standards 
prescribed by the 1988 Large Combustion Plant Directive for SO2, NOx and TSP (LCPD). 
The proposal of a European CO2 tax has long been debated and no formal agreement has 
never been reached.   
As elsewhere in the world, the European electricity sector is undergoing a substantial 
restructuring process. In 1996 a European Directive set goals and the modalities of the 
liberalisation and of the integration of the national electricity markets (Directive 96/92/EC). 
After 2006, all consumers will be admitted to the market. Member States are required to 
allow access to their electricity sector by means of non-discriminatory pricing of electricity 
transmission, and by means of non-discriminatory procedures for construction of new 
generation capacity. The presence of very large producers in some European countries 
coupled with a sub-optimal international transmission capacity will most probably lead to 
monopolistic competition rather than perfect competition in the transition phase. 
In this paper we analyze the interaction between environmental policy and market 
liberalisation in Europe with a multi-country, dynamic partial equilibrium model for the 
European electricity market. We study two questions. First we try to assess what are the 
likely effects of the degree of competition on the state of the environment. Second we 
examine whether, in the imperfect competition case, it pays for a country to relax its 
environmental policy as predicted by the strategic trade literature.   
In section 2 we review the theoretical and applied literature. In section 3 we present our 
model. In section 4 we study the effect of the degree of competition on the state of the 
environment. In section 5 we study the effects of unilateral deviations of environmental 
policy. Section 6 concludes.  
 The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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2.  NON-COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: INSIGHTS FROM THEORY  
A non-competitive market for electricity in Europe has important consequences for the 
way environmental policies can be implemented. 
Trade under oligopolistic competition is characterised by positive profits. This provides an 
incentive to national governments to help domestic firms earn higher profits in the 
international arena. To this purpose, indirect commitment devices may be used when 
explicit trade policies
4 are forbidden by trade agreements. National environmental policies 
have a direct influence on production costs of firms. Given the objective differences in the 
environmental situation of each country, their strategic use cannot easily be detected and 
prohibited. Thus, environmental policy makes a good candidate for an indirect trade policy 
device. From this idea stems quite a large literature on the interaction between 
environmental policy and trade. The first applications are due to Barrett (1994) for 
environmental standards and Conrad (1993, 1995) for taxes. These studies show that, 
compared to first best policies based on the rule that equates marginal social benefit to 
marginal social cost, environmental policies chosen by governments in the Nash 
equilibrium are tougher under Bertrand competition and less stringent under Cournot 
competition.  
The theoretical models used in this strand of literature are in general very simple, with just 
two countries, one producer per country, homogeneous products, a single technology, 
domestic pollution and the whole output sold to a third country. Kennedy (1994) shows 
that including domestic consumers and transboundary pollution in the analysis compounds 
somehow the incentives of domestic governments to distort environmental policy. On one 
hand, governments would be happier if domestic consumers could be satisfied by foreign 
production: in presence of limited transboundary pollution, domestic damages would then 
decrease. On the other hand, governments are still interested in relaxing local 
environmental polices, thus expanding domestic market shares both for strategic reasons 
and because part of the resulting environmental damage would be shifted away by 
transboundary pollution. The overall incentive should be in general ambiguous, but in the 
specification chosen by Kennedy the second strategic effect prevails. 
Technology choice and capacity setting are particularly important for the electricity sector, 
because electricity can be generated using different technologies, each of them 
                                             
4  Brander and Spencer (1985) analyse the rent-shifting behaviour of two governments, which try to support their 
national producer in an international Cournot duopoly, by means of export subsidies. These subsidies act as 
devices that commit national producers to a certain level of output and hence to a higher market share than 
the one they would have achieved in a simple Cournot equilibrium. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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characterised by different costs and by different impacts on the environment. The 
available capacity of these technologies determines the response of the firms to 
environmental policy. Also, generation and transmission capacity licensing can be powerful 
strategic instruments in the hands of the governments. 
These issues have not yet been studied in a theoretical framework. However at least the 
generation capacity aspects and the differences in environmental impacts among 
technologies, are related to those studied in the literature on strategic innovation and the 
environment (for instance Ulph (1994) Ulph (1996), and Ulph and Ulph (1996). In these 
papers, a role analogous to the one of capacity investments is played by R&D 
expenditures. The first two papers consider respectively process and environmental (i.e. 
emission–reducing) R&D. The third paper considers them jointly, proving that they have 
the same distortionary effect on environmental policy. In general, however, it remains 
ambiguous whether this will lead to environmental policies that are stricter or more lax 
than first best ones. Finally, the dynamic analysis by Feenstra (1998) considers explicitly 
the role of investments, but her analysis is confined to the case of a single technology.  
The theoretical literature shows that governments have indeed incentives to distort their 
environmental policies in an international oligopolistic market, but the magnitude and the 
direction of the incentives remain ambiguous. Moreover, theoretical models necessarily 
give an oversimplified depiction of the reality, and thus cannot capture all the complexity 
of the European electricity sector.  
 
3.  MODELLING ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
3.1. Existing  models 
In the empirical literature, we have either models considering environmental policy within a 
perfectly competitive European or American electricity market, or imperfectly competitive 
models of the electricity market where environmental policy plays no role. 
Examples of the first kind of models are Holster (1997) for the European market and 
Palmer  et al. (2001) for the American market. The first model compares a combined 
CO2/Energy tax policy set by the European Commission with a CO2 tax set independently 
by a national government alone, finding the latter to be ineffective. The second model 
considers the interactions between the liberalisation of the American electricity market and 
two versions of a NOx emission cap (seasonal and annual). In particular they analyse the The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
  6
welfare impacts and cost effectiveness of these two policies under “limited restructuring”, 
whereby some States retain price regulation, and under “nationwide restructuring” 
whereby perfect competition is assumed for the whole country. They find, unsurprisingly, 
that the annual cap under nationwide restructuring dominates the other scenarios where 
either liberalisation or environmental policy (or both) is incomplete
5. 
Some national electricity models explicitly include imperfect competition
6. For instance, 
Green and Newbery (1992) describe the deregulated English spot market. Their model 
does not consider investment decisions. Their aim is to assess whether the deregulation 
actually implemented in the United Kingdom in 90’s is preferable to a regulated setting. It 
turns out that either regulation or a more fragmented structure would be advisable, and 
that the duopolistic market engendered by the reform fails to attain the Bertrand outcome 
the British government expected. Kemfert (1999) presents a Cournot model of the German 
electricity market. She finds that such setting gives a more plausible representation of the 
German market than downright perfect competition. 
Wei and Smeers (1996, parts I and II)(, consider an imperfectly competitive electricity 
market for three European Countries under alternative assumptions regarding short run 
price determination: either optimal spot pricing or second lowest marginal cost pricing. 
These studies have a two stage structure: first, a long run Cournot equilibrium in 
capacities is computed, then prices and output are determined according to the 
institutional assumptions regarding the short run price setting. Their representation of the 
European electricity market however is too sketchy to derive any policy conclusion, and 
they are mostly interested in demonstrating that their algorithm reaches a unique 
equilibrium. 
 The only model we are aware of that assesses the European environmental policy within 
an imperfect competition framework is Böhringer et al. (2001). They present a general 
equilibrium model for Germany and consider, like Holster (1997) a unilateral introduction of 
a CO2 tax. They find that the resulting shift towards less carbon-intensive industries is 
more pronounced under imperfect than under perfect competition, but their cost appraisal 
does not yield clear-cut results. They assume that market power in the electricity sector is 
rather limited, positioning de-facto this paper at the borderline between perfect 
competition and oligopolistic competition analysis. Most importantly their representation of 
                                             
5  Welsch (1998) analyses the consequences of a phase-out of nuclear power generation in Germany within a 
perfect competition, general equilibrium model of the European economy. Although it is not directly concerned 
with environmental policy, Welsch (1998) shows that renouncing to the nuclear technology in Germany brings 
about a substantial increase in Germany’s CO2 emissions, and concludes that the rationale for such policy 
should be sought in politics rather than in economics. 
6 A survey of these models is provided by Smeers (1997). The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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oligopolistic behaviour relies on exogenous mark-ups rather than on an explicit game-
theoretic model. 
 
3.2.  A simple description of our model. 
 
We present here a simplified version of our model. A description of the full model is 
provided in Appendix A. In this Section we focus on the simple problem of two countries, 
labelled Home and Foreign, that host each an electricity producer, and that are 
interconnected by two international transmission lines with fixed capacity  HF Q and  FH Q . 
The first line conveys electricity from the Home Country to the Foreign Country, the 
second line is used for electricity flowing in the opposite direction. Using the international 
transmission lines involves a cost of u Euro/MWh for the seller.  
Each producer can generate electricity by means of two technologies, a clean one (labelled 
c), and a dirty one (labelled d) available in capacities  , cd XX and ,, cd YY  respectively in 
the Home and Foreign Country. Each unit of output from clean plants () cc x y  emits  c e  
tons of pollutant; each unit of output from dirty plants  ( ) dd x y  emits  d e  () dc e> e  tons 
of pollutant. Electricity can be generated at a cost of  c c  Euro/MWh using the clean 
technology, and at a cost of  d c  Euro/MWh using the dirty technology.  
We consider a three-stage game. In the environmental policy stage, governments set their 
environmental policy. In the investment stage, firms set their generation capacity for both 
technologies. In the production stage firms compete, taking as given their available 
capacity and the environmental policy. 
3.2.1. The  Production Stage  
 
In the production stage, firms minimise the cost of producing any output level  i Q , and 
choose how much to produce, and where to sell their production, in order to maximise 
their profits, for given capacity levels  , cd XX and  , cd Y Y . We assume that each country 
sells on the domestic market  ii Q  MWh and  ij Q  MWh on the rival country’s market, where 
i,j=H,F and  ii ii j Q=Q+Q . Firms are subject to environmental policies in the form of 
taxes per unit of emissions  HF t, t (and/or emission standards  H e  and  F e ) respectively in 
the Home Country and in the Foreign Country.   The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
  8
The cost function to be minimised by the Home firm is  
(, ,) ( )
cc dd cc dd
H H H HH HH H HH HH CQ t e c x c x t e x e x =++ +, subject to: 
;
dd
HH xX ≤  
;
cc
HH xX ≤  
;
cd
HH H xxQ +≥  
cc dd
HH HH H ex ex e +≤ . 
We assume that the solution to this production problem can be represented by a function  
  , (,,, ) HH H cd CQ t e X X  
 
Having allocated production efficiently between the two technologies, the two firms 
compete on the international market. Under Cournot competition, this means that each 
firm maximises its profits taking into account production and export decisions of its 
opponent. The profit function to be maximised by the Home firm is: 
( ,, ,, , ,, , , )( ,, ,)( , , , , ) H H HF F FH H H HF c d H HF F FH H H H c d HF QQ QQ teQ u XX R QQ QQ C QteXX u Q Π= − −
 
subject to  HF HF QQ ≤ , and taking as given  F Q  and  FH Q . 
A Cournot equilibrium for this stage of the game, is a vector 
** ** ,, ,
HH FFF H QQ QQ     such that 
** ,
HH F QQ    is a best response to 
** ,
FF H QQ    and vice versa, given 
,,,,, , , , , , .
cdcd
H F H FH FF HHHFF ut t e e Q Q X X X X  The equilibrium pay-off for the Home Country is 
then 
** (, , , , , , , , , , )
HH
cdcd
H F H FH FF HHHFF ut t e e Q Q X X X X Π= Π . 
3.2.2.   The Investment Stage 
In the investment stage, firms set the capacities of their plants taking as given the 
environmental policies of the governments, in order to maximise profits for the 
corresponding Cournot equilibrium. In other words, in this stage firms commit to a 
generation capacity level that would put them in the best conditions to compete. In our 
numerical model, the commitment to an optimal level of investment will be characterised 
by the assumption of open-loop strategies
7. 
                                             
7  We prefer to focus on open-loop equilibria both because they are numerically more tractable, and because we 
intend to stress the commitment properties of investments. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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The Home firm chooses  ,
cd
HH XX  in order to maximise 
( )
* (, , , , , , , , , , ) ,
HH
cdcd
H F H FH FF HHHFF H ut t e e Q Q X X X X S X Π= Π − %  
where  () ( ) ,
cd
HH H SX SX X =  is the investment cost. 
A Nash equilibrium for this stage of the game, is a vector 
**** ,,,
cdcd
HHFF XXXX      such that 
** ,
cd
HH XX    is a best response to 
** ,
cd
FF XX    and vice versa, given  HF H F H F F H ut t e e Q Q ,,,,, , . 
The ex-ante equilibrium pay-off for the Home Country is then  
** (, , , , , , )
HH HF H F H F F H ut t e e Q Q Π= Π %% . 
3.3.  The Environmental Policy Stage 
In the environmental policy stage, governments set their environmental policies in a non-
cooperative way. The Home government’s objective function is the sum of domestic 
consumer surplus (CS), domestic firms’ profits, and domestic tax revenues, minus 




() ( ) () ( ) ( )
,, ,, , ,, ,
,, , ,, , .
HHH FFF H H HH F H
H
HF H HH FFF H H H H H F H H H H
W QQ QQ teQ Xu
CS Q Q R Q Q Q Q C Q t e uQ S X t e D e
=
+− − − + −
 
The Foreign government has an analogous objective function. 
From the Trade and Environment literature, we expect that governments do not apply first 
best environmental policies. Instead, they would distort them in order to increase domestic 
welfare at the expense of the rival country
8.  
Governments face conflicting incentives stemming from the consumers’ surplus part of 
their objective function. Consumers’ surplus depends partly on electricity imports, and 
partly on domestic production. As pointed out by Kennedy (1994), in a Cournot setting, 
incrementing the import-dependent component of consumers’ surplus calls for more strict 
environmental policies, because this would favour the foreign producer and would allow 
domestic consumers to import more. On the other hand, incrementing domestic 
consumers’ surplus by means of domestic production calls for less stringent environmental 
policies, because this favours the domestic producer. In our model, international trade is 
                                             
8  Note that, in principle, if the jurisdiction over a line pertains to the country that receives the electricity, 
governments could use the access to the national grid as an extra trade policy tool. However, the Internal 
Market in Electricity Directive 96/62/EC explicitly calls for non-discriminatory access to national grids. Note 
that it does not require the existing transmission capacity to be expanded, only fair and transparent rules for 
accessing the national grids. In our model, this is taken into account by assuming a single price u for 
international transmission of electricity, and fixed transmission capacity.     The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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bounded by the capacity of international connection lines. This limits the amount of 
electricity that can be imported, and hence the incentive for the governments to set overly 
restrictive policies. We would then expect that the concern for the welfare of consumers 
would rather push the governments towards less strict environmental policies.  
The incentives to promote domestic profits are more straightforward. Each government 
would set less stringent environmental policies if this contributes to commit the national 
producer to lower production costs (without generating excessive environmental 
damages).  
In our simulations the environmental policy stage is not modelled in an extensive way. We 
content ourselves with evaluating unilateral deviations from first-best environmental 
policies, without characterising a full Nash equilibrium in the policy game.   
3.4.   Model implementation and Data Used 
The focus of the model is on the electricity sector of Belgium, the Netherlands, France and 
Germany, for a time horizon of 35 years.  
Whilst we intend to capture many of the differences among the four countries by means 
of country-specific data, we do take some simplifying assumptions. In particular, we 
assume that the shape of the demand functions and the way consumers allocate their 
purchases of electricity through sub-periods (peak, off peak) do not depend on their place 
of residence. Moreover, in each country there is just one producer which can generate 
electric power using several plants. Whilst this is a realistic hypothesis for France and 
Belgium, where market concentration is very high, it amounts to a serious simplification of 
the Dutch and German electricity industry. At least three large generators can be found 
there. Our hypothesis of a single national producer means that they behave like a cartel. 
We also assume that fuel prices and relative growth rates are determined on the world 
market and are exogenous. Fuel prices are shown in Figure 1. Finally, given the 
unavailability of transmission cost data, we set transmission costs at 16.7 Euro/MWh for 
international lines and 4.5 Euro/MWh for national lines. These assumptions are obtained by 
calibration of electricity prices in 2000. 
Producers have at their disposal the technologies described in Table 1. In a cost–
minimizing framework, from Figure 1 and Table 1, one would expect that coal and nuclear 
plants, given their low running costs to be used first, whereas gas turbines would be more 
likely used to cope with peak demand. As to investments in new capacity, we expect the 
relationship between investment on one hand and fuel and other variable costs on the 
other, to play a major role in the technology choices of the producers, with expensive The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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units installed only if they guarantee low operation costs. We assume moreover that these 
unit production and investment costs are not influenced by the market regime. 
 
Figure 1: Fuel prices  
The four countries remain very different from each other in several respects. In particular, 
the electricity demanded in 2000, the installed capacity for each technology in 2000, the 
external costs of each pollutant, the share of small consumers in total demand (and, 
consequently, average demand elasticity
9), the demand’s growth rates, and finally the pre-
existing environmental policies are different in each country. For demand data, we draw 
upon the estimates used in the European Union Energy Outlook to 2020. 
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Table 1: Power plant characteristics 
As a measure of the degree of noxiousness of different pollutants, we use the ExternE 
(European Commission (1999)) estimates of the external damages of air emissions. Given 
the linearity of our damage function, these estimates can be regarded as marginal 
damages. These estimates are reported in Table 2 along with other country-specific data, 
and are used as a base for the ex-post welfare evaluation of the various scenarios 
examined. In most of our analysis, we consider only environmental damages caused by 
emissions of air pollutants and hence we disregard other external effects (e.g. accident 
risk for nuclear plants), because these damage estimates are very low in ExternE. For 
nuclear power they amount to about 4.2 Euro/MWh in Belgium, 7.2 Euro/MWh in the 
Netherlands, 5.2 Euro/Mwh in Germany, and only 2.5 Euro/MWh in France. These figures 
are one order of magnitude lower than those for coal under equivalent aggregation 
assumptions (65 Euro/MWh in Belgium, 55 Euro/MWh in the Netherlands, 55 Euro/MWh in 
Germany, 68 Euro/MWh in France). 






























Old Coal   Coal 2.6  84  4101 6021 890  520  52 1428  2.1 
New Coal  Coal 2.32 82  2005 59  793  93  45 1444  1.9 
Nuclear 
Plant 
Nuclear 2.22  85          51  2530   
Old Gas 
Turbine 
nat. gas  3.57  0.9  1607  13  720    20  476  5.8 
Gas STAG 
turbine  
nat. gas  1.87  85  337  7  377    29  619  1.4 
Oil & Gas 
conventional 
Mix 2.38  84  1122  4284  643 476 30  646  1.7 
Gas turbine 
(kerosene) 
Kerosene 3.57 90  1735  1799  720  143  20  476  1.7 
Hydro power  Hydro 2.6  89          3  2375  1.7 





2.38 84  2142  823  643  95  30  646     
STAG for 
cogeneration  
nat. gas  2.61  80  470  9  526    25  836    The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Table 2: Country-specific data
10. 
                                             
10  Sources: European Commission, UNIPEDE, Oosterhuis et al., authors’ calculations and ExternE. The figures in 
brackets refer to gas plants. The estimate for CO2 emission damage refers only to a mid-low estimate of global 
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From Table 2, one notices that the modalities of electricity generation differ strongly 
among countries. For instance, France relies more heavily on nuclear generation than the 
other countries; gas powered plants are more widespread in the Netherlands, whereas the 
share of coal plants is still important in Germany. 
Finally, we assume different interconnection capacities between each pair of countries. 
Given the lack of available data, we derived our assumed capacities from the maximum 
monthly value of load flows between countries
11 and we increased those figures by 10%. 
These capacities are shown in Table 3. We assumed the same capacity for each flow 
direction, no constraints for domestic transmission, and no direct interconnection between 
France and the Netherlands
12.   
 Belgium  Germany  France  The  Netherlands 
Belgium  + ∞ 1550  2000  1350 
Germany  1550 +  ∞ 2600  3300 
France  2000 2600  +  ∞ 0 
The Netherlands  1350 3300  0  +  ∞ 
Table 3: Capacity (MW) of international transmission lines  
3.5.   The baseline   
We will use three alternative assumptions on market regime: Perfect Competition, Price 
Regulation for the whole time horizon and Cournot Competition. All scenarios have a 
common starting point: a regulated price in the period 2000-2004; after this period, each 
scenario then jumps to one of the three market regimes for the rest of the horizon. Instead 
of presenting each environmental scenario in each market regime in turn, we prefer to take 
the first two market regimes as alternative benchmarks and to focus directly on the 
differences between the Cournot outcome and these benchmarks in each scenario. 
                                             
11 Load flows between countries at 3:00 and 11:00 a.m., as reported in the 1999 UCTE Statistical Yearbook. 
12  See Appendix A for a detailed description of transmission capacity constraints. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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In the baseline we assume that the following environmental regulation is in place (see 
Table 4): 
Environmental Problem  Regulation assumed in baseline 
NOx, TSP, SO2  Large Combustion Plant Directive (1988) implemented 
by member state under the form of national bubbles, 
the caps stay fixed for the whole horizon 
CO2  We assume that there is a damage of 18 Euro/ton for 
the period 2010-2034, a carbon tax CAN be 
introduced. 
Nuclear safety  We assume that the EU legislation on nuclear safety is 
observed  
Renewables   No minimum quota’s are imposed  
Table 4: Environmental regulation in the baseline 
Compared to the benchmark there is only one environmental policy variable that will be 
changed: the unilateral tax on CO2 emissions in the electricity sector. We have assumed 
that there is a marginal damage of CO2 equal to 18 Euro/ton. This damage can be 
understood in two ways. First it can be seen as (discounted) climate change damage and 
second as the shadow cost of meeting the EU Kyoto obligation in Europe. Any CO2 
reduction effort in the electricity sector comes down to a reduced call upon internationally 
traded carbon emission rights whose cost we fix at 18 Euro / ton. 
We will later on use unilateral CO2 tax deviations to evaluate the incentives for national 
governments to deviate from a uniform European CO2 tax in a Cournot equilibrium. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
  16
4. POLICY  SIMULATIONS   
4.1.  Who Benefits from Imperfect Competition? 
Before examining environmental impacts it may useful to compare briefly the three market 
regimes. We compare the perfect competition outcome with the Cournot outcome in Table 
5. Our simulations confirm the traditional result that imperfect competition reduces 
aggregate welfare, and that the benefits stemming from monopoly profits and lower 
environmental damages are more than compensated by the decrease in consumers’ 
surplus.  
 
Bn Euro B D F NL TOTAL
Consumer Surplus -57.33 -375.03 -305.75 -77.80 -815.90
Producers Profits  18.40 114.67 99.02 18.64 250.73
Taxes  9.65 52.95 46.53 7.45 116.58
Damage SO2 -2.38 -69.62 -2.26 1.73 -72.52
Damage NOx -2.32 -84.74 -15.88 -0.15 -103.10
Damage CO2 -1.59 -34.70 -8.44 -1.45 -46.17
 Damage TSP -0.41 -14.67 -1.42 0.34 -16.16
Environmental Damages -6.70 -203.72 -28.00 0.47 -237.95
Environmental taxes 0000 0
Social welfare -22.58 -3.69 -132.19 -52.18 -210.64
 
Table 5: Baseline case. Difference between Cournot and Perfect Competition. 
Welfare outcomes (Bn Euro)
13 
Table 5 presents for the Baseline case, the cumulative welfare difference between the 
Cournot and the Perfect Competition outcomes. It includes consumer surplus of electricity 
consumers, producers profits, total tax revenues and revenues from CO2 taxes only, 
monetary damages of CO2, SO2, NOx and TSP emissions and their total value.  
From Table 5 one concludes that the most important welfare effect of Cournot 
Competition is the reduction in consumers’ surplus. Consumers under Cournot Competition 
pay prices that are on average
14 45% higher than regulated prices in 2000. The largest 
effects take place in the countries with the largest internal market, namely Germany and 
France. The main winners under Cournot Competition are of course the producers, whose 
profits increase considerably. Notice that profits are proportional to the size of the internal 
market of each country. This indicates that transmission capacity constraints provide 
                                             
13 A negative sign means that the Perfect Competition case has a larger value. 
14 Weighted average prices, where market shares are used as weights. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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strong local market powers to producers on their domestic markets. Not all the countries 
suffer to the same extent from imperfect competition. Germany has a rather dirty initial 
generation mix so that a reduction of domestic output gives large environmental benefits. 
BDFN L T O T A L
Consumer Surplus -47.64 -309.27 -236.38 -62.62 -655.90
Producers' Profits 13.96 81.45 63.81 12.14 171.37
Taxes 5.56 22.40 15.94 1.57 45.47
Damage SO2 -2.37 -69.11 -1.44 1.63 -71.29
Damage Nox -2.32 -82.69 -13.55 -0.14 -98.70
Damage CO2 -1.55 -33.59 -7.29 -1.04 -43.47
Damage TSP -0.42 -14.45 -1.16 0.31 -15.72
Environmental Damages -6.65 -199.84 -23.44 0.76 -229.17
Environmental Taxes 00000
Social Welfare -21.46 -5.58 -133.19 -49.67 -209.90
Table 6: Baseline case. Difference between Cournot Competition and Price 
Regulation. Welfare outcomes (Bn Euro)
15 
Table 6 compares Cournot Competition with Price Regulation. We find the same kind of 
results
16 as in Table 5 but differences are a little less marked, because under Price 
Regulation national firms retain an important profit margin. Profits under Cournot 
Competition remain by far the highest of the three market regimes considered. 
Some international trade of electricity takes place in all market regimes. Given the strong 
similarity in trade patterns among regimes, we exemplify them by reporting only those 
under Cournot Competition in Figure 2. 
                                             
15 A negative sign means that the Price Regulation case has a larger value. 
16 The solver treats this case as a perfect competition model where the cost function has been shifted upw  ards. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Figure 2: Baseline case. Net trade flows under Cournot Competition 
Trade patterns are not very much affected by the kind of competition, and are particularly 
similar under Perfect Competition and Price Regulation. With the exception of France, 
trade balances are slightly higher in magnitude under Perfect Competition. France and 
Germany are net exporters of electricity, while Belgium and the Netherlands are net 
importers. In fact, Germany and France have much larger available capacities in cheap 
base load technologies than Belgium and the Netherlands and are always able to export 
some of their production.  
 
4.2. Does  Imperfect  Competition Help to Meet Environmental 
Targets? 
 
Given the partial equilibrium setting of our model, we must distinguish between targets 
clearly specified for the electricity sector, such as the Belgian and Dutch caps on SO2 and 
NOx emission, and targets specified for the whole national economy, such as CO2 targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol. For the second type of targets, we measure the reduction in 
total CO2 emissions in the electricity sector. 
From our computations it is clear that, whilst the Belgian and Dutch NOx emission 
constraints are always binding in the Baseline scenario under Perfect Competition, their 
stringency declines under Cournot Competition. In particular, actual Belgian NOx emissions 
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are below the target in the period 2005-2019, whereas NOx emissions remain a binding 
constraint in the Netherlands in all periods but 2005-2009.  
Quite the opposite story happens for SO2 emissions. The SO2 constraint is never binding in 
both countries under Perfect Competition, but becomes binding for the Netherlands in 
three periods under Cournot Competition. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3 below. Cournot Competition brings about two effects that 
have a direct influence on the stringency of environmental policies: technology substitution 
and output reduction. Note that it is not granted that the first factor will lead to the 
adoption of less polluting technologies. In fact, from Table 5 one notices that 
environmental damages actually increase in the Netherlands under Cournot Competition. 
This is due to the fact that output reduction in this country mainly affects the investment 
in new nuclear, wind and gas plants (which have no or very low air emissions) while the 
use of waste incinerators and kerosene plants actually increases. Given the higher prices 
prevailing under Cournot Competition, the Dutch generator has to invest less in new base-
load capacity. It is more profitable to invest in plants more suitable for peak-load 




Figure 3: Baseline scenario. Emission reductions in excess of the targets for SO2 
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Figure 4: Baseline scenario.+ European CO2 tax. Difference between CO2 
emissions under Perfect versus Cournot Competition   
 
Turning to CO2 emissions, Figure 4 illustrates the differences in CO2 emissions between 
Perfect and Cournot Competition in the baseline scenario to which we have added a CO2 
tax. Figure 4 shows that, over the whole time horizon considered, the CO2 tax achieves 
more substantial CO2 emission reductions under Cournot Competition but this does not 
necessarily hold in each period and in each country. Compared to Cournot Competition, 
these emissions are slightly lower under Perfect Competition in Belgium from 2020 
onwards, in the Netherlands between 2010 and 2019, while France has substantially 
lower emissions under Perfect Competition starting from 2030. This is due to an effect 
similar to the one that we have noticed taking place in the Netherlands for SO2 emissions. 
France in particular does not invest at all in new nuclear plants in this scenario under 
Cournot Competition, while it does invest in new nuclear capacity under Perfect 
Competition after 2025. 
BDF N L T O T A L
Consumers Surplus -57.88 -365.13 -287.82 -81.38 -792.21
Producers Profits  19.60 116.90 91.83 22.64 250.98
Taxes  10.03 44.24 39.36 10.96 104.60
Damage SO2 -2.48 -60.23 -1.81 0.44 -64.08
Damage NOx -2.35 -47.70 -3.51 -0.10 -53.67
Damage CO2 -0.91 -15.69 -2.20 -0.09 -18.89
Damage TSP -0.41 -10.58 -0.25 0.08 -11.16
Environmental Damages -6.15 -134.20 -7.78 0.32 -147.81
Environmental taxes -0.66 -10.66 -2.01 -0.06 -13.39
Social Welfare -22.09 -69.79 -148.85 -48.10 -288.83  
Table 7: Baseline scenario.+ European CO2 tax U-Kyoto Tax scenario. Difference 
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BDF N L TOTAL
Consumer Surplus -49.34 -305.48 -226.01 -66.36 -647.19
Producers Profits  15.61 87.09 60.54 15.82 179.06
Taxes  6.26 16.86 12.36 4.68 40.17
Damage SO2 -2.45 -60.74 -1.63 0.59 -64.24
Damage NOx -2.34 -47.35 -2.60 -0.11 -52.38
Damage CO2 -0.90 -15.41 -1.67 -0.17 -18.15
Damage TSP -0.40 -10.62 -0.20 0.11 -11.12
Environmental Damages -6.10 -134.12 -6.10 0.41 -145.90
Environmental Taxes -0.65 -10.35 -1.52 -0.09 -12.61
Social Welfare -21.37 -67.41 -147.01 -46.28 -282.06  
Table 8: Baseline + CO2 tax scenario. Difference between Cournot and Price 
Regulation. Welfare outcomes (Bn Euro) 
 
As to the welfare effects of a European Kyoto tax, consider Table 7 and Table 8. These 
tables present the same kind of results as in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively, under the 
hypothesis that a European tax on CO2 equal to half the (assumed) marginal damage of 
this pollutant (18 Euro/ton) is implemented in 2005-2009 and that a European tax on CO2 
equal to the (assumed) full marginal damage is implemented from 2010 onwards. 
Comparing Table 7 with Table 5 one notices that the difference in welfare between the 
two market regimes increases with the implementation of a CO2 tax. This happens 
because correcting an externality unambiguously improves welfare under Perfect 
Competition. Under Cournot Competition, Pigouvian taxes should be coupled with a 
production subsidy in order to restore optimality. If used alone, they result in extra 
deadweight losses because the existing imperfect competition distortions are aggravated
17. 
A similar argument explains what happens under Price Regulation. Comparing Table 7 with 
Table 8, one notices a slight decrease in the difference in welfare with respect to the 
Cournot case, when the comparison is drawn against price regulation instead of perfect 
competition. Under Price Regulation, firms have a small profit margin, and imposing a 
Pigouvian tax brings about a small deadweight loss
18. 
 
                                             
17 The implementation of a CO2 tax also helps meeting the SO2 and NOx targets. From the comparison of Table 5 
with Table 7, one notices that the decrease in damages from these pollutants is more pronounced in Belgium 
under a CO2 tax, whereas in the Netherlands the increase in SO2 damages is smaller. This happens because of 
the correlation between emission factors across technologies. A plant that emits significant amounts of CO2 is 
likely to have significant SO2 and NOx emissions as well. Therefore a policy aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, 
in absence of specific abatement technology, will lead to reduction in the emissions of other pollutants, 
through output reductions from the polluting plants. This holds both under Perfect and Cournot competition.  
18 Trade patterns are not very much affected by the presence of a CO2 tax. Since the implementation of a CO2 
tax results in higher prices and lower demand, trade balances are slightly higher in magnitude in the Baseline 
scenario.  The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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4.2.1.  Is there an Incentive for Individual Countries to Relax Their 
Environmental Policy as Predicted by the Strategic Trade 
Literature? 
 
In order to fully answer this question, one should in principle compute the Nash equilibrium 
of the game in which each country sets its environmental policies taking as given the 
environmental policies of the other countries
19. We do not take this option, both because it 
is computationally very demanding, and because, within the European Union, countries do 
not enjoy complete freedom in their environmental policy choices. The targets set in 
European Directives or in the international protocols heavily limit their strategy space. 
However, countries are given some leeway in the implementation of these targets. We ask 
ourselves, therefore, whether national governments would be interested in unilateral 
deviations from the CO2 tax set at the common marginal damage level (or opportunity cost 
level) of 18 Euro/ton. The results are shown in the following Figures and in the Tables 
presented in Appendix B
20. 
 
                                             
19 Had we assumed perfect foresight also on the part of governments, we would expect that only a government 
that can foresee welfare gains for its country would engage in strategic environmental policy distortions. 
However, a common result in the Trade and Environment literature is that distortionary policies lead to a 
prisoner’s dilemma. In fact a country adopting a commitment device to support its national producer would 
gain with respect to a free-trade outcome if it were the only one to take such option, while a free-trade 
outcome is superior to the Nash equilibrium where all the countries pre-commit. A myopic perspective is hence 
more appropriate. 
20  In this section and in Appendix B we distinguish between “Social welfare only CO2”, which takes into account 
only CO2 damages in the damage function and  “Social Welfare”, which takes into account damages from all 
air pollutants. This distinction has been introduced to highlight the fact that, in the EU-Kyoto Tax scenarios, a 
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Figure 5a:   Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Belgium from CO2 tax under Cournot 
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Figure 6b:   Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Belgium from CO2 tax under Cournot 
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Figure 7a: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Germany from CO2 tax under 
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Figure 8b: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Germany from CO2 tax under 
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Figure 9a: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in France from CO2 tax under 
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Figure 10b: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in France from CO2 tax under 
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Figure 11a: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in The Netherlands from CO2 

















 Belgium Germany France the Netherlands
 
Figure 12b: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in The Netherlands from CO2 
tax under Cournot competition, only damages from CO2 included in welfare 
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Figure 13: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Belgium from CO2 tax under 
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Figure 14: Welfare effects of unilateral deviations in Germany from CO2 tax under 
Cournot competition: welfare components in detail 
 
Figure 5a shows the differences between the Cournot outcome under uniform taxes for 
the four countries and the Cournot equilibria where Belgium unilaterally reduces its CO2 tax 
by 10% at the time, while in the other countries the tax is kept constant, when damages 
from all pollutant are taken into account in the welfare function, while in Figure 5b only 
CO2 damages are taken into account. Figures 6a, 6b to 8a, 8b show the same kind of 
results for Germany, France and The Netherlands. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the detailed The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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effects on welfare components for selected deviations in Belgium and Germany. More 
detailed tables for the four countries are provided in Appendix B. 
Two facts are clear from these results. First, incentives to deviate depend on which 
environmental damages are included in the welfare function of the governments. Second, 
some countries may welcome unilateral deviations on the parts of their rival.   
As to the first point, notice that if only CO2 damages are taken into account (Figures 5b, 
6b, 7b and 8b), each of the four countries would welcome any unilateral reduction of its 
own tax. However, when the damages of all pollutants are included in the welfare function 
(Figures 5a, 6a, 7a and 8a), only the Netherlands would still find it always profitable to 
deviate, Germany would never find it profitable, Belgium would welcome a reduction if it is 
at least 50%, France would consider either small reductions (up to 20%) or very large 
reductions (at least 60%). This uneven result is explained by the differences in marginal 
damages of SO2, NOx and TSP emissions across countries, and in the technologies 
adopted. Germany pollutes more and values the damages from these three pollutants more 
than the Netherlands. Given the correlation among CO2 and the other atmospheric 
pollutants, reducing the CO2 tax has harsher consequences in Germany than in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, the main effect of modifications in the CO2 tax in a country is that 
either the output levels of operating plants are affected or, for large modifications, the 
merit order of the plants in that country changes accordingly. This implies that welfare 
effects of unilateral deviations can be discontinuous, reflecting the switch from less 
polluting to more polluting plants. This could also explain the non-monotonic pattern of 
social welfare in Belgium and France. As long as operating plant output is expanded as a 
response to mild reductions in domestic CO2 taxes, the welfare trade-off is limited to 
output (and hence domestic surplus) expansion versus increased emissions (and hence, 
domestic damages) from the same plants. For more substantial reductions, the producer 
may find it profitable to switch production to dirtier plants with considerably lower 
operating cost, and the resulting increase in profits and consumers’ surplus may well 
compensate the increase in environmental damages, especially if their marginal value is 
not too high.  
In some instances countries can benefit from unilateral deviations on the part of their 
rivals. This can happen for two main reasons. Consumers benefit from cheaper imports, 
and domestic emissions fall as a consequence of the reduction of domestic production. 
This is Kennedy’s (1994) “pollution shifting” effect. In our simulations, this effect is 
prevailing, for instance, in Belgium as a consequence of unilateral reductions of 10, 30 and 
40% in France’s CO2 tax. More often however, fiercer competition from the deviating 
country reduces welfare in rival countries, both because of the fall in national producers’ The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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profits, and because the rival producers are forced to adopt dirtier technology to sustain 
competition, in a sort of a race to the bottom. 
An unilateral tax reduction not always induces a fall in the profits of the rival countries (in 
fact this happens consistently in our simulations only for unilateral deviations in Germany, 
as shown in Figure 10). Given the discrete nature of technology adoption decisions, and 
the different transmission capacities of international lines, if a non-deviating country loses 
market share on a given market as a consequence of a tax reduction in another country, it 
is not granted that the deviating country would be able to cover it fully. Then some other 
country could be in a position to satisfy the residual demand, thus expanding its own 
market share and its profits.  
 
5.   CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we used a dynamic numerical model to assess the importance of the degree 
of competition for the implementation of environmental policies within the European 
electricity sector. 
Our model compares three market regimes: the widely used perfect competition paradigm, 
a price regulated monopoly regime, and a multi-market Cournot model. The three market 
regimes have the same electricity transmission constraints. Our environmental policy focus 
has been on the stringency of environmental policies under imperfect versus perfect 
competition. Moreover, we examined the effects of unilateral distortions of a CO2 tax. 
Our simulations confirm that, even if environmental policy is not optimal, as it is clearly 
the case for the European electricity sector, perfect competition is clearly superior to 
Cournot competition when it comes to welfare comparisons. The price regulation regime 
stands in between the two, but quite close to the perfect competition outcome due to the 
low profit margin assumed. The higher profits and the lower environmental damages that 
result from Cournot competition fail to compensate for the huge losses in consumer 
surplus. In our framework, this result is reinforced by two factors. On the one hand, the 
limited international transmission capacity leaves significant local market power to 
generators on their domestic markets. On the other hand, the decrease in output under 
imperfect competition is sometimes accompanied by a shift towards more polluting 
technologies, thus reducing the beneficial environmental effects of lower output levels.  
As a consequence, our results on the interaction between the market regime and 
environmental targets are mixed. Whilst the stringency of sulphur dioxide targets declines 
under Cournot competition, NOx targets become more difficult to reach under Cournot 
competition. As to CO2 taxes, their implementation under Cournot competition leads to The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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larger deadweight losses, and hence, the lower emission levels are reached at a higher 
social cost. Moreover, although overall CO2 emissions are higher under perfect 
competition, some countries actually experience higher CO2 levels in some years under 
Cournot competition.  
Our investigation on strategic incentives showed that the appeal of unilateral deviations of 
environmental policy depends crucially on which kind of objective function the 
governments have and on the environmental policy is pursued for the other pollutants. If 
they take into account damages from all pollutants and that these pollutants are 
insufficiently regulated, the attractiveness of unilateral deviations declines sharply 
compared to the case in which they take only carbon emission damages into account or 
that the other pollutants are regulated optimally. An interesting and somewhat surprising 
collateral result is that some governments may welcome unilateral deviations on the part 
of their opponents. We singled out two factors that may explain this result. On one hand, 
Kennedy’s (1994) “pollution shifting” effect induces governments to welcome to a certain 
extent electricity imports because of the induced increase in consumers’ surplus and 
decrease in domestic emissions. On the other hand, in presence of transmission 
constraints and several technologies, a unilateral deviation may cause a rival to lose more 
market share than the generator based in the deviating country is actually able to cover. 
Other producers may then jump in and cover the residual demand. 
Overall, our simulations suggest that it is worthwhile taking into consideration factors that 
may lead to preservation of market power, when evaluating environmental policies for the 
electricity sector 
However, our results require a number of qualifications. For one thing, the numerical 
model in its present form hinges on some strong hypotheses. 
In particular the values chosen for transmission costs, transmission capacities, marginal 
damages of emissions, CO2 tax rate, elasticity of demand, mark-ups on costs in 2000 are 
all based on educated guesses or, at best, adapted from studies not immune from 
uncertainties (such as, for instance, ExternE estimates for external damages).  
Moreover, some equations of the model are quite rough representations of the real 
constraints that they are supposed to depict. In particular, international electricity 
transmission flow equations disregard Kirkhoff’s laws, transboundary pollution is included 
only in the sense that CO2 marginal damages are the same everywhere, but no 
transboundary matrix for conventional pollutants has been included, and trade to countries 
other than the four included in the model is not considered, not even as residual trade. Our 
on-going research is directed to overcome these drawbacks and also to include other The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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policy scenarios such as the recent Directive Proposal on renewable energy sources
21. Our 
preliminary results indicate that imposing renewable source quotas to European countries 
can involve serious welfare losses in absence of flexible implementation instruments. 
                                             
21 Parliament and Council Directive Proposal No. 500PC0279 (10/05/2000) The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Appendix A :   Description of the Numerical Model 
Our model considers the dynamic equilibrium for the electricity sector of four neighbouring 
European countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Germany. The model is dynamic 
in the sense that the electricity market equilibrium is modelled for a long time horizon 
(2000-2034). Such a time span is sufficient to cover the long lifetimes that power 
production investments generally have, and hence the main differences between nuclear 
power generation and other technologies can be properly highlighted. Thus, a dynamic 
setting allows us to take into full consideration the consequences in terms of technology 
choice of the various policy scenarios we analyse. We assume that all agents have perfect 
foresight.  
Our model consists of: 
•  A supply module for electricity generation in each country; 
•  A demand module for electricity in each country; 
•  An environmental module describing external damages caused by electricity generation 
in each country; 
•  A regulatory module describing environmental targets binding for electricity generation 
in each country; 
•  A transmission module describing how electricity can be physically exchanged in the 
international market; 
We consider six sub-periods within a year (base, load, medium, shoulder, high, and peak) 
all having the same length across the four countries. In each country, a single electric 
utility supplies electricity to the national and international grids using the following 
technologies:  
NP  •  Nuclear power plants  KEROP  •  Kerosene turbines 
CP  •  Coal power plants   HYP  •  Hydro power turbines 
NCP  •  New coal power plants   WP  •  Wind turbines 
MIXP  •  Mixed fossil fuel power 
plants 
WAP  •  Municipal waste 
incinerators 
GP  •  Gas turbines   CHP  •  Gas-based co-generation 
plants 
NGP  •   New gas turbines  (STAG)    The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Table A.1: Generation technologies 
 
Consumers buy electricity from the municipal distribution company at a price per kWh. 
This tariff includes marginal costs (production, transport and distribution) and a rent that 
goes to the municipal distributor. Under perfect competition, the share accruing to 
producers just covers their marginal costs. Hence, to represent a multi-nodal market 
equilibrium under perfect competition we use the minimisation of production costs for a 
given demand. For the algebraic representation of the behaviour of each agent, we will use 
the following conventions: 
SETS PARAMETERS 
t  years   α  distribution of consumption 
across sub-periods 
v  vintage year   af    availability factor 
i  sub-periods within  a year  ∆   lifetime dummy 
n,m  nodes (countries: B, D, F, NL)  inv investment cost  
z       technologies  r  discount factor  
Em   emissions  (NOx, SO2, CO2, TSP)   dam emission damage (Euro/ton) 
  e   emission rate (ton/MWh) 
VARIABLES
22  PARAMETERS (continued) 
P  electricity price (Euro/MWh)  t  emission  tax (Euro/ton) 
Π net producer surplus (Euro)  θ  interconnection dummy 
Q consumption (MWh)  c generation cost (Euro/MWh) 
X  production (MW)  lgt length of sub-period (hours) 
I  investment  (MW)  tra    transport cost (Euro/MWh) 
Qb electricity transiting through Belgium   β weight of Consumers’ Surplus 
Qd electricity transiting through Germany   
The model is implemented numerically in three stages. 
First, a demand function is calibrated for a given demand level. Under perfect competition, 
producers behave as cost-minimising firms. Since competition sets prices equal to marginal 
                                             
22 All variables are required to be positive. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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costs, for a given demand producers minimise the total costs of electricity supply. We 
exploit this feature for the calibration of the demand function  ( ) n,t n,t n,t n,t P=a -  bQ , where 
n,t Q  is the total quantity sold at t node n during year t. For calibration, demand is 
exogenously fixed to the observed levels in 2000-2004, and to projected levels in 
subsequent periods. We have taken into account that what is observed in 2000-2004 is 
actually the result of price regulation policies by including a price margin per MWh in that 
year. 
Second, a benchmark perfect competition scenario, with price regulation in 2000, is 
computed by means of a welfare maximisation. We use the outcome for 2000 of this 
reference scenario as the common starting point for all our policy scenarios. 
Finally, we compute our policy scenarios. We compare outcomes under perfect 
competition to outcomes under Cournot competition and price regulation. 
A number of constraints further define our problem, and are always present in the three 
stages described.  
Firstly
23, generated electricity actually supplied at each node, must equal demand at that 
node.  
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Moreover, each electric producer must take into account capacity constraints for its power 
plants and reserve constraints for national grids, in order to assure enough supply of 
electricity even in peak periods. 
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Equation (A.2) simply stipulates that output in any given year should never exceed the 
available capacity, determined by the investments made until that year. Equation (A.3) 
requires that the same capacity must be sufficient to cover demand in each period plus a 
reserve margin. Implicitly, it amounts to assuming that each country is in principle self-
sufficient, and that trade occurs for comparative efficiency reasons.  
                                             
23 In what follows, production  z,i,n,m,t  X is indexed not only for the period and sub-period in which it is 
produced, the firm that produces it, the technology used for production, but also for the country where it is 
generated and the country where it is sent. This allows us to regard the sum of  z,i,n,m,t  X over  m as The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Existent environmental policies are taken into account in terms of unit emissions 
specifications of the plants and in the form of maximum allowed NOx and SO2 emissions 
from Dutch and Belgian plants. The latter are specified in the model by means of the 
following constraints: 
in e mznt zinmt e mnt
mi z
lgt e X e ≤ ∑∑ ∑ , ,,, , ,, , ,, for n=B,NL   and  2X em=SO ,NO   (A.4) 
Finally, international electricity sales are constrained by the capacity and the shape of the 
grid. Since this is rather complex, we will now describe it in detail here. 
In order to understand how we model the international transmission of electricity, consider 
Figure A.1. As shown in the figure, we assume that there are direct interconnections 
between any couple of countries but the Netherlands and France, and that there are two 
separate lines connecting any couple of interconnected countries, one for each flow 
direction. Therefore, electricity traded at any moment between the Netherlands and France 
must be transmitted using the existing links connecting them with the other two countries, 
and using the transmission capacity not utilized in that moment for direct trade between 
countries directly interconnected. For instance, if the French producer sells  i, t X  MW to 
the Dutch market at time i of year t, this amount of electricity may reach its destination 
either passing through Germany or passing through Belgium, but only if at that moment 
there is enough transmission capacity on the links between France and Germany, Germany 
and the Netherlands, and/or between France and Belgium, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Of course this also influences what can be directly traded between countries that have a 
direct interconnection. The actual capacity of these lines is then reduced by what is used 
in order to allow trade between the Netherlands and France. 
We take, however, some simplifying assumptions. In particular: 
•  All transmission lines entail the same transmission cost. This incidentally implies 
that the transmission cost between France and the Netherlands is double the cost 
between any two directly interconnected countries; 
•   Electricity follows the most direct path to any destination. Hence, we rule out the 
possibility that in order to go from France to the Netherlands (and vice versa), 
electricity will use the Belgium-Germany line as well.  
                                                                                                                                  
production per unit of time in country n with technology z, and the sum of  z,i,n,m,t  X over z as sales per unit 
of time of a firm based in n to country m. The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Figure A.1: The international grid 
Let  n,m,i, t qb be the share of electricity that goes from country n to country m passing 
through Belgium, and let  n,m,i, t qd  be the share of electricity that goes from country n to 
country m passing through Germany. Formally, we then represent the structure of the 
international grid by means of the following equations. 
Electricity sent from France to the Netherlands (and vice versa) goes through either 
Belgium or Germany:  
, , ,, ,, , ,, ,; ziFN L t FN Lit FN Lit
z
Xq b q d ≤+ ∑ , , ,, ,, , ,, , ; z i NL F t NL F i t NL F i t
z
Xq b q d ≤+ ∑       (A.5) 
Electricity sent from a country to another must not exceed the capacity of the 
international line, minus the electricity simultaneously transiting through that country and 
directed either to the Netherlands or France: 
, ,,, , , ,,, , ;; ziBDt BD ziDBt DB
zz
XY XY ≤≤ ∑∑                            (A.6) 
,, , , , , ,, ,, , , , , ,, ;; ziN LBt N LB N LFit ziBN Lt BN L FN Lit
zz
XY q b XY q b ≤− ≤− ∑∑           (A.7) 
,, , , , , ,, ,, , , , , ,, ;; ziDFt DF N LFit ziFDt FD FN Lit
zz
XY q d XY q d ≤− ≤− ∑∑           (A.8) 
,, , , , , ,, ,, , , , , ,, ;; z i NL D t NL D NL F i t z i D NL t D NL F NL i t
zz
XY q d XY q d ≤− ≤− ∑∑         (A.9) 
,, , , , , ,, ,, , , , , ,, ;; ziDFt DF N LFit ziDN Lt DN L FN Lit
zz
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,, , , , , ,, ,, , , , , ,, ;; ziBN Lt BN L FN Lit ziBFt BF N LFit
zz
XY q bX Y q b ≤− ≤ − ∑∑             (A.11) 
, ,,, , , , , , ,,, , ,, , ;; z i F B tF B F N L i t z i B F tB F N L F i t
zz
X Y qb X Y qb ≤− ≤− ∑∑            (A.12) 
Finally, electricity traded between the two not interconnected countries (France and the 
Netherlands), must equal the available transmission capacity connecting them to the other 
two countries minus the electricity otherwise traded using those lines: 
,, , , , , ,, , , ,, , , ,, , , ,, , ,; ziN LFt N LD N LB ziDFt ziBFt ziN LDt ziN LBt
zz z z z
XY YX X X X ≤+− − − − ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ (A.13) 
, , ,, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,, , , ,,. ziFN Lt FD FB ziFDt ziFBt ziDN Lt ziBN Lt
zz z z z
XY Y X X X X ≤+− − − − ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑    (A.14) 
We can now describe more precisely the three stages of our model. 
 Cost Minimisation  
The utility's cost minimisation problem is 
zinmt
znt
nz n t z i n m t
X
I
in zint zinmt nm nmt zinmt znv t znv t
ti z m m z z n
Min C I X
r lgt c X tra X inv I θ ==
=

++       ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
,, , ,
,,
,, , ,, ,
,, , , , , , ,, , , , , , , , , , ,
(, )
   (A.15) 
In order to calibrate the demand function, we consider the equilibrium reached when all 




Min C ∑                                                                                         (A.16) 
subject to Equations (A.1)-(A.14) and to  nt nt QQ = . 
Perfect Competition Benchmark  
With the parameters of the demand function in hand, we can compute the perfect 
competition equilibrium. By definition, in such equilibrium the surplus of consumers and 
producers are maximised, taking prices as given. The perfect competition equilibrium can 
therefore be mimicked by solving the following problem: 
zinmt
nzt
nt mt in zinmt n X
nm i i z I
Wr C SP l g t X C
 
=+ −     ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
,, , ,
,,
,, , , , , ,
t
MAX                      (A.17)   
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is the consumers surplus and where  n C  is defined in (A.15) .  
 
Policy Scenarios under Perfect and Cournot Competition 
In order to allow comparison among the results of our scenarios, we assume that for all of 
them the situation in 2000 is the outcome, for that year, of the benchmark model 
described in the previous Section. We then run our simulations from 2005, keeping fixed 
the levels of all decision variables in 2000-2004. 
Under Perfect Competition, this amounts to solving problem (A.17) from 2005 onwards, 
subjects to the policy constraints defining each scenario.  
Suppose then that firms behave in a non-competitive way in the international electricity 
market. In any given year t, at each node m, consumers are prepared to pay for each MWh 
purchased a price   
() m,t z,i,n,m,t z,i,-n,m,t m,t m,t i,n z,i,n,m,t
ni z
 PX , X = a - b l g t X

  ∑∑ ∑                            (A.18)           
We assume that producers use open-loop strategies. Each producer’s problem then boils 
down to maximising the discounted stream of his profits taking as given the strategy path 




nm t m t m t i n z i n m t n X
tm i i z I
ra  -  b Q l g t XC

Π=   ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
,, , ,
,,
,, , , , , , , MAX -            ( A . 1 9 )  
subject to Equations (A.1)-(A.14) and given  z,i,-n,m,t X X,z,i,-n,m;t , z,-n,t I  and where  n C  is 
defined in (A.15).  
Discounted total profits consist of the revenues at each node, minus production and 
transmission costs.  
Welfare Function of the Governments 
In evaluating the outcomes of the various scenarios considered in this paper, we will take 
the viewpoint of the national governments. Each government will evaluate the 
consequences of environmental regulations using a Social Welfare function  n SW . This 
function encompasses the weighted sum of private surplus of consumers  n CS  and the 
producers’ surplus  n Π , minus environmental damages  n DAM : 
nn n n SW CS DAM β =+ Π −.                                                            (A.20) The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Total emission damages  n DAM  take into account emission damages of all pollutants, 
evaluated using a linear damage function: 
ne m z n i n z i n m t e m z n t
te m z i m
DAM r dam lgt X e = ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ,, , , ,, , ,,,
,
                               (A.21)      
The parameter  em,z,n  dam  summarizes the characteristics of emissions of pollutant em  
from a plant using technology z in country n
24. 
                                             
24 Note that in this formulation, each government cares only about those environmental damages affecting its 
own territory. The presence of transboundary pollution makes this sub-optimal from an international point of 
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Appendix B :  Welfare Effects Of Unilateral Deviations From CO2 




Table Germany  
 
Table  France  
90% 80% 70%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   1.895 1.087 -0.413 -0.037 1.760 2.672 0.226 0.133 0.959 3.010 1.200 0.099
Producers' Profits  -0.247 0.537 -0.203 -0.129 -0.248 1.229 -0.294 -0.211 -0.145 2.836 -0.186 -0.206
Environmental Damages 8.103 2.103 -0.159 0.030 8.220 51.789 -0.395 0.068 7.289 44.511 -4.288 -0.015
Social welfare Only CO2 1.570 0.756 -0.916 -0.303 1.405 0.416 -0.311 -0.259 0.655 2.097 1.113 -0.291
Social Welfare -5.548 -1.163 -0.812 -0.283 -5.778 -41.290 0.000 -0.268 -5.805 -34.228 3.980 -0.234
60% 50% 40%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   1.803 5.653 0.322 0.162 -0.013 6.939 0.821 0.035 1.781 10.106 -0.297 0.104
Producers' Profits  -0.253 3.743 -0.369 -0.227 -0.080 5.865 -0.325 -0.203 -0.353 7.106 -0.439 -0.224
Taxes  0.887 4.944 -0.334 -0.133 -0.084 4.594 -0.150 -0.159 0.775 4.311 -0.562 -0.143
Environmental Damages 7.961 58.499 -0.095 0.067 0.000 48.509 -0.054 0.042 8.097 62.317 -0.173 0.070
Social welfare Only CO2 1.445 3.727 -0.348 -0.258 -0.177 7.414 0.360 -0.364 1.219 10.228 -1.247 -0.322
Social Welfare -5.524 -44.160 -0.287 -0.265 -0.178 -31.111 0.400 -0.370 -5.894 -40.794 -1.125 -0.332
90% 80% 70%
b n  E U R O BDFN L BDFN L BDFN L
Consumers' Surplus   0.147 -0.035 0.779 -0.062 0.539 -0.402 0.795 -0.072 0.078 -0.029 0.479 -0.032
Producers' Profits  -0.077 0.027 0.162 0.052 -0.142 0.387 0.214 0.024 -0.042 0.028 0.346 0.021
Taxes  -0.074 0.012 0.062 0.049 0.120 -0.109 -0.198 0.070 -0.039 0.020 -0.148 0.050
Environmental Damages -0.025 -0.058 0.080 -0.017 3.744 -8.317 0.372 -0.047 -0.009 0.005 2.192 -0.051
Social welfare Only CO2 0.024 0.008 0.979 0.029 0.163 0.698 0.810 -0.037 0.010 0.017 0.257 0.003
Social Welfare 0.021 0.063 0.922 0.055 -3.227 8.193 0.438 0.069 0.005 0.014 -1.515 0.090
60% 50% 40%
b n  E U R O BDFN L BDFN L BDFN L
Consumers' Surplus   0.123 0.010 0.989 -0.032 1.791 -0.743 0.739 0.019 0.132 0.059 2.204 -0.173
Producers' Profits  -0.070 -0.014 0.539 0.071 -0.220 -0.297 0.912 -0.166 -0.047 -0.087 0.893 0.121
Taxes  -0.059 -0.013 -0.156 0.116 0.910 -0.841 -0.167 -0.098 -0.021 -0.046 -0.147 0.094
Environmental Damages -0.011 -0.034 2.317 0.067 8.084 -4.331 2.240 0.054 0.006 0.158 2.799 -0.028
Social welfare Only CO2 0.008 -0.016 0.926 0.101 1.497 -1.461 0.958 -0.308 0.065 -0.100 2.359 0.034
Social Welfare 0.006 0.018 -0.944 0.087 -5.604 2.450 -0.756 -0.299 0.058 -0.231 0.150 0.072
90% 80% 70%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   0.171 -0.442 -0.064 -0.103 0.132 -0.739 -0.014 -0.006 1.214 -0.365 -0.264 -0.057
Producers' Profits  0.091 0.067 0.014 0.082 0.309 -0.639 -0.114 -0.014 0.147 0.310 0.126 -0.095
Taxes  0.010 -0.888 -0.017 0.089 0.084 -2.609 -0.141 0.032 0.273 -0.182 -0.058 -0.055
Environmental Damages 0.470 -14.168 -0.054 0.036 0.809 -20.962 -0.086 0.059 7.265 -9.282 -0.317 0.004
Social welfare Only CO2 0.177 0.011 -0.053 0.039 0.338 -2.106 -0.244 -0.037 0.744 0.595 -0.100 -0.259
Social Welfare -0.198 12.905 -0.013 0.032 -0.284 16.976 -0.182 -0.047 -5.631 9.044 0.121 -0.212
60% 50% 40%
bn EURO B D F NL B D F NL B D F NL
Consumers' Surplus   0.254 -1.202 1.210 -0.070 0.433 -0.836 0.934 -0.190 0.515 0.133 0.107 0.025
Producers' Profits  0.646 -0.386 0.086 -0.097 0.764 -1.146 0.047 0.040 0.919 0.044 -0.230 -0.202
Taxes  0.054 -1.405 0.138 -0.055 -0.009 -3.348 0.256 0.064 -0.041 -0.035 -0.386 -0.153
Environmental Damages 1.188 -12.516 -0.713 0.035 1.176 -19.924 0.075 0.074 1.271 -1.485 -0.508 0.012
Social welfare Only CO2 0.694 -1.846 1.612 -0.277 0.909 -3.278 1.224 -0.152 1.047 0.286 -0.339 -0.373
Social Welfare -0.234 9.523 2.147 -0.257 0.013 14.594 1.162 -0.161 0.121 1.626 -0.002 -0.342The Opening of the European Electricity Market and Environmental Policy: Does the Degree of Competition Matter? 
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Table  the Netherlands  
 
90% 80% 70%
b n  E U R O BDFN L BDFN L BDFN L
Consumers' Surplus   0.011 -0.050 -0.007 0.068 -0.039 -0.007 0.009 0.116 -0.026 0.099 -0.002 0.072
Producers' Profits  -0.010 0.025 0.022 0.130 0.024 0.001 0.009 0.266 0.014 -0.057 -0.005 0.467
Taxes  -0.035 0.008 -0.057 -0.060 -0.011 -0.005 -0.067 -0.163 0.009 -0.031 -0.021 -0.239
Environmental Damages -0.011 -0.029 -0.342 0.040 -0.024 -0.054 -0.359 0.113 0.007 0.020 -0.070 0.131
Social welfare Only CO2 -0.006 -0.015 0.035 0.066 0.001 -0.006 0.031 0.111 -0.004 0.009 -0.012 0.173
Social Welfare -0.022 0.011 0.299 0.099 -0.001 0.043 0.310 0.105 -0.010 -0.010 0.043 0.168
60% 50% 40%
b n  E U R O BDFN L BDFN L BDFN L
Consumers' Surplus   -0.020 0.237 -0.015 0.100 0.025 0.220 -0.006 0.143 0.016 0.108 0.762 0.303
Producers' Profits  0.007 -0.112 -0.006 0.608 -0.023 -0.089 -0.004 0.744 -0.005 -0.109 -0.100 0.951
Taxes  0.003 1.916 -0.029 -0.369 -0.017 1.961 -0.008 -0.496 -0.030 -0.070 0.207 -0.469
Environmental Damages 0.000 15.736 -0.081 0.159 0.007 15.916 -0.004 0.176 -0.025 0.049 1.054 -0.019
Social welfare Only CO2 -0.010 0.078 -0.031 0.205 -0.015 0.102 -0.017 0.240 0.007 -0.081 0.730 0.444
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